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1. 
MANY  OF  YOU  WHO  ARE  FAMILIAR  WITH 
I 
THE  ECONOMIC  COMMUNITY  AND  THEREFORE  AWARE 
OF  THE  SENSITIVITY  THAT  HAS  TRADITIONALLY 
SURROUNDED  ANY  MENTION  OF  THE  TERM  SECURITYJ  .. 
'  OR  EVEN  WORSE  DEFENSEJ  IN  THE  CONTEXT  OF  THE 
COMMUNITYJ  MAY  HAVE  BEEN  SURPRISED  THAT  I 
. ---·.  ·--· ------- - .  -- ·-
SHOULD  CHOOSE  SUCH  AN  ISSUE  AS  THE  SUBJECT 
OF  MY  TALK  TODAY.  I  CAN  ASSURE  YOU  THAT  IT 
IS  NOT  TO  BE  PROVOCATIVE  OR  TO  DOWNPLAY  THE 
VERY  SERIOUS  SOCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ISSUES  THAT 
FACE  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITYJ  BUT  BECAUSE  AT 
TUtS  MOMENT  IN  TIME  CURRENT  TENSIONS  BETWEEN 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  EUROPE  POINT  URGENTLY 
TO  THE  NEED  FOR  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  BEGIN  TO 
TAKE  RESPONSIBILITY  THAT  IT  HAS  LONG  AVOIDED. 
IN  OTHER  WORDSJ  THE  SITUATION  DEMANDS  THAT 
EUROPEANS  BEGIN  TO  DEVELOP  A COMMON  AND 
A MORE  INDEPENDENT  APPROACH  TO  THE 
REQUIREMENTS  OF  WESTERN  SECURITY. 
/IF  I  REFRAIN 2.  -- ----------- ------~ I 
IF  I  REFRAIN  FROM  DESCRIBING 
I 
UNITED  STATES  - EUROPEAN  RELATIONS  AS 
BEING  IN  A STATE  OF  CRISIS  IT  IS  BE-
CAUSE  THAT  TERM  DOES  NOT  ADEQUATELY 
DESCRIBE  THE  DYNAMIC  THAT  IS  CURRENTLY 
AT  WORK.  THE  WORD  CRISIS  SUGGESTS  THE 
POSSIBILITY  OF  SUDDEN  AND  DRAMATIC 
CHANGE  - HOWEVER1  I  BELIEVE  tHAT.  THE 
PROBLEMS  WE  SEE  TODAY  REFLECT  TRENDS  WHICH 
WILL  SLOWLY  BUT  IRREVOCABLY  CHANGE  THE 
'  ' 
STRUCTURE  OF  WESTERN-SECURITY, 
IT  IS  HOW  THAT  CHANGE  WILL  TAKE 
'• 
PLACE1  HOW  EUROPE  WILL  RESPOND  AND  THE  ROLE 
THAT  THE  COMMUNITY  SHOULD  PLAY  THAT  I  AM 
CONCERNED  WITH  TODAY. 
LOOKING  AT  THE  CURRENT  STATE  OF 
ATLANTIC  RELATIONS  IT  IS  EVIDENT  THAT  ATTITUDES 
AND  PERSPECTIVES 
~ND PERSPECTIVES  ON  EITHER  SIDE  OF  THE 
ALLIANCE  ARE  BADLY  OUT  OF  PHASE1  OUR 
OBJECTIVES  AND  INTERESTS  NO  LONGER  RUN 
PARALLEL1  WE  NO  LONGER  SEE  THE  WORLD  IN 
THE  SAME  WAY.  THE  PHRASE  THAT  "WHAT  UNITES 
:  II 
US  IS  GREATER  THAN  WHAT  DIVIDES  US  HAS  AN 
INCREASINGLY  HOLLOW  RING.  HOWEVER1  IN  ORDER 
TO  PUT  THE  CURRENT  SITUATION  IN  PERSPECTIVE 
IT  IS  WORTH  REMEMBERING  THAT  WE  HAVE  BEEN 
HERE  MANY  TIMES  BEFORE.  THE  ATLANTIC 
RELATIONSHIP  HAS  ENDURED  SEVERAL  SEVERE  JOLTS 
AND  MANY  OF  THE  CURRENT  ISSUES  HAVE  BEEN 
AROUND  FOR  A LONG  TIME. 
BUT1  IT  IS  ALSO  WORTH  NOTING  THAT 
- THE  RECONCILIATION  OF  PAST  DISPUTES  HAS  ONLY 
BEEN  POSSIBLE  BECAUSE  BOTH  SIDES  HAVE 
DEMONSTRATED  FLEXIBILITY  AND  A WILLINGNESS 
TO  COMPROMIS~ 1  AND  BECAUSE  A DEGREE  OF 
DIVERSITY  HAS  BEEN  ACCEPTED  AS  INEVITABLE 
IN  AN  ALLIANCE 4. 
IN  AN  ALLIANCE  OF  FIFTEEN  SOVEREIGN  AND 
EQUAL  NATIONS.  UNFORTUNATELY  THE  POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENT  THAT  HAS  PERMITTED  THE  ATLANTIC 
ALLIANCE  TO  RECONCILE  DIVERGENT  VIEWS1  OR 
'  ' 
TO  ACCOMODATE  AN  "AGREEMENT  TO  DISAGREE1" 
HAS  CHANGED  IN  A DRAMATIC  FASHION.  DEFENSE 
AND  THE  ATLANTIC  RELATIONSHIP  HAVE  BECOME 
THE  OBJECT  OF  INTENSE  PUBLIC  INTEREST  AND 
'  . 
OF  CONSIDERABLE  PUBLJC  CRITICISM.  THE 
COMBINED  EFFECT  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY  DISPUTES 
AND  WORSENING  ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS  HAS  BEEN 
\ .. 
TO  HARDEN  OFFICIAL  ATTITUDES  AND  POSITIONS. 
UNDER  THE  GLARE  OF  PUBLIC  SCRDTlNY-:GOVER~MENTS 
HAVE  LOST  THEIR  ABILJTY1  AND  IN  CERTAIN  : 
INSTANCES1  THEIR  WILLINGNESS  TO  MANEUVER 
AND  TO  COMPROMISE  IN~·ORDER TO  SECURE 
AGREEMENT  AND  ACCOMODATION. 
IN  MY  VIEW  THREE  FACTORS  ARE 
RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  NEW  SITUATION  IN  WHICH 
/WE  FIND  OURSELVES 
5. 
WE  FIND  OURSELVES.  FIRSTLY1  THE  SHEER 
NUMBER  OF  DISPUTES  THAT  AFFECT  US  - THESE 
ARE  MORE  WIDE  RANGING  AND  PROFOUND  THAN 
PREVIOUSLY1  AND  THE  RESULT  IS  THAT  OUR 
POLITICAL  SYSTEM  IS  IN  DANGER  OF  BEING 
OVERLOADED. 
SECONDLY1  THE  FACT  THAT  WE  DISAGREE 
ON  AN  ISSUE  THAT  IS  FUNDAMENTAL  TO  THE 
EXISTENCE  OF  THE  ALLIANCE  - THE  POLICIES 
THAT  THE  WEST  SHOULD  BE  FOLLOWING  TOWARDS 
THE  SOVIET  UNION.  IT  IS  NOT  NECESSARY  FOR 
ME  TO  ANALYSE  THE  MANY  DISPUTES  THAT  REFLECT 
THE  DIVERGENCE  OF  VIEW  CONCERNING  THE  SCALE 
OF  THE  THREAT  AND  THE  RESPONSE  THAT  IS 
REQUIRED~  YOU  ARE  BY  NOW  FAMILIAR  WITH  THEM. 
WHAT  IS  IMPORTANT  TO  STRESS  HERE  IS 
THAT  THE  IDEALOGICAL  CONVICTION  OF  THE  REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION  HAS  EFFECTIVELY  POLARIZED 
A DIVERGENCE  WHICH  HAS  LONG  BEEN  APPARENT  -
NOTABLY  THE  FACT 6. 
NOTABLY  THE  FACT  THAT  THROUGH  GEOGRAPHICAL 
PROXIMITY  AND  HISTORICAL  EXPERIENCE  THE 
EUROPEANS  HAVE  DEVELOPED  CLOSER  LINKS  TO  THE 
EAST  AND  THAT  THE  POLITICAL  AND  ECONOMIC· 
ENVIRONMENT  CREATED  BY  THESE  LINKS  HAS 
INEVITABLY  ALTERED  EUROPEAN  PERCEPTIONS 
OF  THE  SO-CALLED  SOVIET  CHALLENGE.  THIS 
PROCESS  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  HAS  PREVIOUSLY 
BEENEFFECTIVELY  OBSCURED  AND  ACCOMODATED 
WITHIN  THE  ALLIANCE  FRAMEWORK.  WHERE  IN  THE 
' 
PAST  THERE  WERE  AMBIGUITIES)  WHERE 
DIFFERENCES  WERE  LEFT  UNEXPLORED)  NOW  U~DER 
THE  RELENTLESS  PRESSURE  OF  THE  REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION  THE  LINES  OF  DIVISION  ARE 
SHARPLY  DEFINED. 
THE  DETERMINATION  OF  THIS 
ADMINISTRATION  TO  IMPOSE  ITS  WORLD  VIEW  AND 
TO  EXERT  WHAT  IT  CONSIDERS  TO  BE  EFFECTIVE 
LEADERSHIP)  LEAVES  LITTLE  ROOM  FOR  COMPROMISE 
AND  ACCOMODATION.  THE  LOW 
/TOLERANCE  LEVEL 
TOLERANCE  LEVEL  FOR  THOSE  WHO  DO  NOT  SEE 
THINGS  THE  SAME  WAY  MAKES  THE  RECONCILIATION 
OF  SENSITIVE  ISSUES  DOUBLY  DIFFICULT. 
THIS  ISJ  AFTER  ALLJ  THE  CRUX  OF  THE 
GAS  PIPELINE  ISSUE  - BOTH  SIDES  CAN  RATIONALISE 
THEIR  RESPECTI\!E:  POSITIONS  BY  REFERENCE  TO 
EVENTS  I~  POLAND  OR  AMERICAN  GRAIN  SALESJ  BUT 
THE  BASIC  ISSUE  IN  DISPUTE  IS  MORE  . 
FUNDAMENTAL.  IT  CONCERNS  THE  EUROPEAN 
REFUSAL  TO  ACCEPT  THE  THESIS  PREVALENT  IN 
MANY  QUARTERS  HERE  THAT  THE  WEST  IS  IN  A 
STATE  OF  PERMANENT  CONFLICT  WITH  THE  SOVIET 
UNIONJ  A CONDITION  THAT  DEMANDS  THAT  ALL  OUR 
POLICIES  ARE  COORDINATED  WITHIN  A STRATEGY 
AIMED  AT  CHECKING)  COUNTERING)  OR  UNDER-~ 
MINING  THE  SOVIET  SYSTEM.  TO  MOST  EUROPEANS 
THIS  APPROACH  IS  AS  UNACCEPTIBLE  AS  IT  IS 
DANGEROUS. 
THE  THIRD  AND  POTENTIALLY  MOST 
SIGNIFICANT  FACTOR  IN  THE  CHANGED  POLIT~CAL 
ENVIRONMENT  CONCERNS  PUBLIC  OPINION. 
/oN  BOTH  SIDES 8. 
ON  BOTH  SIDES  OF  THE  ATLANTIC  INTEREST  IN 
DEFENCE  AND  THE  ATLANTIC  RELATIONSHIP  HAS 
INCREASED  SUBSTANTIALLY.  GOVERNMENTS  NOW 
FACE  THE  UNENVIABLE  TASK  NOT  ONLY  OF  RESOLVING 
DISPUTES  BETWEEN  THEMSELVES  BUT  ALSO  OF 
REGAINING  THE  SUPPORT  OF  THEIR  PUBLICSJ 
MANY  OF  WHOM  ARE  DISILLUSIONED  AND  FRUSTRATED 
WITH  CURRENT  POLICIES. 
IN  EUROPEJ  THE  ANTI-NUCLEAR  PROTEST 
MOVEMENT  HAS  BECOME  AN  ESTAB~ISHED FEATURE  . 
OF  OUR  POLITICAL  LIFEJ  IT  REPRESENTS  AN 
INFLUENCE  THAT  NO  GOVERNMENT  CAN  AFFORD  TO 
IGNOREJ  AND  ALREADY  IT  HAS  HAD  A SIGNIFICANT 
IMPACT  ON  ALLIANCE  POLICIES.  SUDDENLYJ  WELL-
ESTABLISHED  PRACTICES  AND  POLICIES  ARE  UNDER 
CHALLENGE}  SUDDENLYJ,ALLIANCE  POLICIES  WHICH 
IN  PREVIOUS  YEARS  WOULD  HAVE  BEEN  PASSED 
UNNOTICED  ARE  UNDER  SCRUTINY.  SUDDENLYJ 
ALLIANCE  LEADERS  HAVE  REALISED  THAT  PUBLIC 
/SUPPORT  FOR 
9. 
SUPPORT  .FOR  DEFENSE  CAN  NO  LONGER  BE  TAKEN 
FOR  GRANTED.  THE  NUCLEAR  DEBATE  HAS  BROUGHT 
DEFENSE  OUT  OF  THE  SHADOWSJ  IT  IS  NO  LONGER  THE 
FORGOTTEN  CHILD  OF  NATIONAL  POLICY. 
I  SHALL  REFRAIN  FROM  COMPARING  THE 
FREEZE  MOVEMENT  HERE  AND  THE  ANTI  NUCLEAR 
MOVEMENT  IN  EUROPE.  I  SHALL  ONLY  COMMENT  THAT 
FOR  EUROPEANS  THE  GROWTH  OF  THE  FREEZE  MOVE-
MENT  WAS  A REASSURING  DEVELOPMENT}  BECAUSE  IT 
SHOULD  HAVE  PROVED  TO  AMERICANS  THAT  THE 
THOUSANDS  OF  DEMONSTRATORS  IN  EUROPEAN 
CITIES  LAST  YEAR  WERE  DEMONSTRATING  OUT  OF 
REAL  CONCERN  OVER  NUCLEAR  POLICYJ  AND  NOT 
BECAUSE  THEY  WERE  INTIMIDATED  BYJ  OR  · 
SUBSERVIENT  TOJ  OR  EVEN  IN  THE  PAY  OFJ  THE 
. SOVIET  UNION. 
THERE  IS  AN  IMPORTANT  LESSON  TO  BE 
DRAWN  FROM  THE  CURRENT  UNREST  BOTH  HERE  AND  . 
IN  EUROPE  OVER  NUCLEAR  WEAPONSJ  AND  THAT  IS 
THAT  PUBLIC  SUPPORT  FOR  NATIONAL  DEFENSE 
POLICIES  CAN  ONLY 10. 
POLICIES  CAN  ONLY  BE  SUSTAINED  IF  THE  GENERAL 
PUBLIC  CAN  IDENTIFY  WITH  THE  OBJECTIVES  AND 
THE  MEANS  OF  THAT.POLICY.  THE  SPECIAL  AND 
TERRIBLE  NATURE  OF  NUCLEAR  WEAPONS  HAS 
INEVITABLY  MADE  THE  TASK  OF  EXPLAINING  OUR 
DEFENCE  STRATEGY  PARTICULARLY  DIFFICULT. 
HOWEVER~  THE  SUDDEN·  PUBLIC  AWARENESS 
OF  THE  IMPLICATIONS  OF  OUR  CURRENT  POLICIES 
HAS  MADE  THIS  TASK  DOUBLY  URGENT. 
DEFENCE  POLICY  IS  NO  LONGER  THE  PRESERVE  OF 
f 
A SMALL  GROUP  OF  SPECIALISTS  TALKING  A 
LANGUAGE  AND  LIVING  IN  A WORLD  THAT  ONLY  THEY 
UNDERSTAND.  IT  IS  NOW  A MATTER  OF  MASS 
CONSUMPTION  AND  PARTICIPATION.  WE  WILL  NOT 
BE  ABLE  TO  SUSTAIN  PUBLIC  SUPPORT  IF  WE  ALLOW 
OUR  STRATEGY  TO  BE  DOMINATED  BY  SCENARIOS 
THAT  ARE  AT  THE  EXTREME  END  OF  THE  THREAT 
SPECTRUM  AND  WHICH  HAVE  LITTLE  RELEVANCE 
TO  POLITICAL  REALITY.  tF  WE  ARE  TO  REGAIN 
' 
PUBLIC  CONFIDENCE~  THEN  OUR  DEFENCE  POLICIE~ 
MUST  BE  BASED  ON  RATIONAL  ASSESSMENTS  AND 
SCENARIOS~ 
11. 
SCENARIOS~  AND  WHICH  INVOLVE  POLITICAL 
ASSUMPTIONS  THAT  ARE  CONSISTENT  WITH  THE 
POLITICAL  EXPERIENCE  OF  OUR  SOCIETIES. 
JUST  AS  BOTH  SIDES  OF  THE  ATLANTIC 
HAVE  EXPERIENCED  THE  ANTI-NUCLEAR  PHENOMENA~ 
SO  EQUALLY  BOTH  SIDES  ARE  EXPERIENCING  THE 
PROBLEM  OF  DECLINING  ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS  AND 
THE  EFFECT  THAT  LOW  OR  NEGATIVE  GROWTH  HAS 
HAD  ON  THE  RESOURCES  AVAILABLE  FOR  DEFENCE. 
SINCE  THE  LATE  1970's~  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 
HAVE  CONSISTENTLY  REFUSED  TO  RESPOND  TO 
AMERICAN  PRESSURE  FOR  GREATER  EXPENDITURE 
ON  DEFENCE~  ARGUING  THAT  ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS 
RULED  OUT  FURTHER  INCREASES.  NOW~  AS  THE 
ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE 
ADMINISTRATION'S  DEFENCE  PROGRAMME  BECOME 
EVIDENT~  IT  WOULD  APPEAR  THAT  THE  UNITED 
STATES  IS  ALSO  EXPERIENCING  THE  RESTRAINING 
HAND  OF  ECONOMIC  CIRCUMSTANCE.  HAVING 
DETERMINED  TO  REBUILD  AMERICAN  MILITARY 
.  ..  .; 
POWFR. 12. 
POWER~  IT  IS  EVIDENT  THAT  EVEN  WITH  THE 
SUBSTANTIAL  INCREASES  IN  EXPENDITURE  CURRENTLY 
PLANNED~  THE  ADMINISTRATION  WILL  NOT  BE  ABLE 
-to  ACHIEVE  ALL  ITS  OBJECTIVES. 
HOWEVER~  ANY  SATISFACTION  THAT  WE 
EUROPEANS  MIGHT  DERIVE  FROM  THE  SIGHT  OF 
THIS  ADMINISTRATION  GRAPPLING  WITH  WHAT  FOR 
US  HAS  BECOME  A FAMILIAR  DILEMMA  OF  MATCHING 
RESOURCES  WITH  REQUIREMENTS  SHOULD  BE,  2.-.. · 
SHORTLIVED.  THE  DIL.EMMA  FACING  THE  REAGAN 
ADMIN-ISTRATION  WILL  CERTAINLY  HAVE  SERIOUS  .  ' 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  us  ~  NOT  ONLY  WILL  IT 
INCREASE  THE  ALREADY  SEVERE  PRESSURE  FOR 
EUROPEANS  TO  DO  MORE·. FOR  WESTERN  DEFENCE~ 
BUT  IF  HARD  CHOICES  HAVE  TO  BE  MADE  WITHIN 
THE  AMERICAN  DEFENCE  BUDGET~  THEN  IN  THE 
CURRENT  POLITICAL  ENVIRONMENT  PRESSURE  WILL 
CERTAINLY  BE  STRONG  TO  PLACE  THESE  RESOURCES 
IN  AREAS  OF  GREATEST  NEED  - AND  THIS  IS 
UNLIKELY  TO 
I  I 
13. 
UNLIKELY  TO  BE  AMERICA'S  SO-CALLED  "WEALTHY 
ALLIES". 
PUBLIC  INTEREST  HAS  ADDED  A NEW 
DIMENSION  TO  THE  QUESTION  OF  ALLIANCE 
SECURITY)  NOT  ONLY  BECAUSE  IT  HAS  BEGUN  TO 
CHALLENGE  EXISTING  ASSUMPTIONS  ABOUT  DEFENCE 
BUT  BECAUSE  ON  BOTH  SIDES  OF  THE  ATLANTIC 
PUBLIC  OPINION  HAS  BEGUN  TO  QUESTION  THE 
CONTINUING  RELEVANCE  OF  THE  ATLANTIC 
ALLIANCE.  THE  CUMULATIVE  EFFECT  OF 
DIFFERENCES  OVER  SECURITY)  FOREIGN  POLICY 
AND  ECONOMIC  POLICY  HAS  BEEN  TO  RELEASE~  ON 
EITHER  SIDE~  THE  STEREOTYPES  AND  MISPERCEP-
TIONS  THAT  LURK  BENEATH  THE  SURFACE  OF  THE 
ATLANTIC  PARTNERSHIP. 
HERE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES~  THE  tAST 
TWO  YEARS 14. 
TWO  YEARS  HAS  SEEN  AN  ALMOST  ENDLESS  STREAM 
OF  PUBLIC  CRITICISM~  AS  REPRESENTED  IN  THE 
MEDIA  AND  ON  CAPITOL  HILL~  CONCERNING  THE 
WORTHINESS  OF  AMERICA'S  ALLIES.  THE  :' 
PERCEPTION  THAT  THE  EUROPEANS  .ENJOY  A "FREE 
RIDE"  IN  DEFENCE  WHILE~  AT  THE  SAME  TIME~ 
REFUSING  TO  SUPPORT  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN 
CRITICAL  FOREIGN  POLi.CY  IN.ITIATIVES  HAS 
BECOME  ALL  PERVASIVE. 
' 
' 
THIS  I~OF COURSE~A FAMILIAR  REFRAIN. 
THE  IDEA  THAT  THE  AMERICAN  COMMITMENT  TO 
NATO  IS  A "GIFT"  THAT  THE  UNITED  STATES  MAKES 
TO  EUROPE  IS  NEVER  FAR  FROM  THE  HEART  OF  ANY 
AMERICAN  CRITICISM  OF  THE  ATLANTIC  ALLIANCE. 
AN  INTERESTING  COMMENT  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  THE 
PUBLIC  DEBATE  HERE  HAS  BEEN  PROVIDED  ~y THE 
PRODUCTION  BY  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENCE  OF 
TWO  SUCCESSIVE  REPORTS  ON  ALLIANCE  BURDEN 
SHARING.  THESE  REPORTS  HAVE  PRESENTED  A 
THOROUGH  AND 
15. 
THOROUGH  AND  COMPREHENSIVE  ANALYStS  OF  THE 
ISSUE  OF  BURDEN  SHARING.  THE  REPORTS  FOR  1981 
AND  1982  BOTH  EMPHASIZED  THE  TREMENDOUS 
COMPLEXITY  INVOLVED  IN  ATTEMPTS  TO  COMPARE 
ALLIED  DEFENCE  EXPENDITURES~ BUT  BOTH  ALSO 
STATED  THAT  WHEN  ALL  RELEVANT  CRITERIA  WERE  . 
TAKEN  INTO  ACCOUNT~  THE  EUROPEAN  ALLIES  WERE 
DOING  ~Ai LEAST"  OR  "ROUGHLY"  THEIR  FAIR 
SHARE  OF  THE  DEFENCE  BURDEN.  YET  DESPITE 
THIS  JUDGEMENT~  THE  PERCEPTION  THAT  THE 
EUROPEANS  DO  NOT  PROVIDE  ENOUGH  FOR  THEIR 
O~IN  DEFENCE  REMAINS  VIRTUALLY  UNTOUCHED~  AND 
CONGRESSIONAL  CRITICISM  C.ONTINUES  AS  IF  THE 
REPORT  ON  BURDEN  SHARING  DID  NOT  EXIST. 
THIS  CRITICAL  APPROACH  TO  THE  NATO 
COMMITMENT  WILL  INEVITABLY  BECOME  MORE 
INTENSE  AS  AMERICA'S  ECONOMIC  WORRIES  BECOME 
GREATER  AND  AS  THE  NEED  FOR  CHOICE  IN  DEFENCE 
PRIORITIES  BECOMES  OBVIOUS.  AMERICAN 
FRUSTRATION  WITH 16. 
FRUSTRATION  WITH  THE  ATLANTIC  RELATIONSHIP 
IS  FURTHER  FUELED  BY  ECONOMIC  DISPUTES  WITH 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AS  THESE  REINFORCE 
THE  AMERICAN  PERCEPTION  OF  THE  UNBALANCED 
NATURE  OF  THE  RELATIONSHIP  - IN  THE  ECONOMIC 
FIELD  THE  EUROPEANS  ARE  TOUGH  COMPETITORS 
WHILE  IN  THE  SECURITY  FIELD  THEY  CONTINUE  TO 
APPEAR  AS  SUPPLIANTS,. 
. CRITICISM  OF  ALLIANCE  MEMBERSHIP 
'  f 
HAS  ALSO  GROWN  IN  EUROPE~  BUT  FOR  RATHER 
DIFFERENT  REASONS.  EUROPEAN  PUBLIC  OPINION 
HAS  BECOME  CRITICAL.  OF  ALLIANCE  MEMBERSHIP 
INASMUCH  AS  IT  IS  SEEN  TO  INVOLVE  UNACCEPT-
ABLE  POLICIES  SUCH  AS  THE  CURRENT  DEPENDENCE 
ON  NUCLEAR  WEAPONs.· ..  AS  THE  NUCLEAR  GUARANTOR 
OF  THE  ALLIANCE~  THE  UNITED  STATES  OBVIOUSLY 
BECOMES  THE  CHIEF  VILLAIN  IN  THE  ANTI-NUCLEAR  , 
DEBATE.  BENEATH  THIS  EUROPEAN  CRITICISM~ 
THERE  EXISTS  A FUNDAMENTAL  AND~ 
IN  MY  VIEW  UNJUSTIFIED~  RESENTMENT  THAT 
ALLIANCE  POLICIES 
. . 
17. 
ALLIAN~E POLICIES  ARE  DICTATED  BY  THE  UNITED 
STATES  AND  ARE  CHIEFLY  FOR  THE  BENEFIT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  - HENCE~  THE  ARGUMENT  THAT 
CURRENT  AMERICAN  STRATEGY  IS  DESIGNED  TO 
LIMIT  ANY  FUTURE  CONFLICT  TO  EUROPEAN 
TERRITORY.  THE  COMBINATION  OF  THIS 
PERCEPTION  AND  A CONFRONTATIONAL  AMERICAN 
ADMINISTRATION  PROVIDES  THE  INGREDIENTS  FOR 
THE  GENERAL  UNREST  THAT  EXISTS  IN  EUROPE 
TODAY . 
THE  CHALLENGE  THAT  CONFRONTS  WESTERN 
POLITICAL  LEADERS  IS  TO  REBUILD  PUBLIC 
CONFIDENCE  IN  OUR  SECURITY  FRAMEWORK  AND  TO 
DEVELOP  A SECURITY  POLICY  THAT  IS  RELEVANT 
TO  THE  EXPERIENCE  AND  THE  EXPECTATIONS  OF 
OUR  PEOPLE~  AND  CONSISTENT  WITH  OUR  POLITICAL 
AND  ECONOMIC  CIRCUMSTANCES. 
BE~AUSE OF  THE  BASIC  DIFFERENCES 
THAT  EXIST  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
EUROPE  ON  THESE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES 
I  BELIEVE 18. 
I  BELIEVE  THAT  THE  SOLUTION  TO  THIS  DILEr1MA, 
BOTH  FOR  EUROPE  AND  FOR  THE  ALLIANCE,  IS 
FOR  EUROPEANS  TO  DEVELOP  A COMMON  APPROACH 
TO  THE  REQUIREMENTS  OF  WESTERN  SECURITY,·, 
AN  APPROACH  THAT  WOULD  DERIVE  FROM  EUROPEAN 
ASSESSMENTS  AND  EUROPEAN  PERSPECTIVES. 
THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  .A  MORE 
COORDINATED  EUROPEAN  APPROACH  WOULD  HAVE 
A NUMBER  OF  ADVANTAGES. 
'  • 
FIRSTLY,  IT  WOULD  PERMIT  EUROPEANS 
TO  PLAY  A MORE  EFFECTIVE  AND  ASSERTIVE 
ROLE  WITHIN  THE  AL(IANCE.  THE  ALLIANCE 
WILL  ONLY  CONTINUE  TO  FUNCTION  IF  EUROPEAN 
INFLUENCE  CAN  ENSURE~·THAT ALLIANCE  POLICIES 
TAKE  ADEQUATE  ACCOU~J OF  EUROPEAN  INTERESTS. 
·. 
IN  THIS  RESPECT 
------·- ·-· 
19.  IN  THIS  RESPECT,  SEVERAL  IMPORTANT 
•  • 
ISSUES  CONFRONT  THE  ALLIANCE  WHOSE 
RESOLUTION  COULD  BE.  CRITICAL  IN  SUSTAINING 
PUBLIC  SUPPORT  FOR  THE  ALLIANCE. 
fiRSTLY,  THE  QUESTION  OF  THE 
ROLE  OF  NUCLEAR  WEAPONS  IN  ALLIANCE 
STRATEGY  AND  THE  RELATED  PROBLEM  OF 
' 
CREATING  A VIABLE  CONVENTIONAL  DEFENCE 
POSTURE  ~N  EUROPE. 
As  A RESULT  OF  THE  ANTI-NUCLEAR 
MOVEMENT  IN  EUROPE,  THERE  ARE  SIGNS  THAT 
THE  ALLIANCE  IS  LOOKING  FOR  WAYS  TO  REDUCE 
THE  RELIANCE  ON  NUCLEAR  WEAPONS.  SOME 
OBSERVORS  HAVE  ADVOCATED  THE  ADOPTION  OF 
A "NO  FIRST  USE"  STRATEGY.  OTHERS  HAVE 
RECOMMENDED  THE  REDUCTION  OF  BATTLEFIELD 
NUCLEAR  WEAPONS  IN  THE  BELIEF  THAT  THESE 
SYSTEMS  NO  LONGER  OFFER  A PRACTICAL  OR 
CREDIBLE  OPTION  FOR  NATO.  PARALLEL  TO 
THIS  PROCESS  IS  A NEW  EMPHASIS  ON 
CONVENTIONAL  FORCES.  WE  SHOULD  AVOID 
RUSHING  TO  HASTY  JUDGEMENTS  THAT  A  CONVENTIONA 20. 
DEFENSE  IS  NEITHER  FEASIBLE  NOR  AFFORDABLE 
- WE  SHOULD  FIRST  CONSIDER  CAREFULLY  WHAT 
DEGREE  OF  INSURANCE  WE  REQUIRE  AND  THEN 
EXAMINE  THE  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  EXPENDITURE. 
SECONDLY~  THERE  IS  THE  RELATED 
ISSUE  OF  ARMS  CONTROL  NEGOTIATIONS.  WHILE 
WE  CAN  HAVE  LITTLE  IMPACT  ON  THE  START 
NEGOTIATIONS~  THE  INf  TALKS  CONCERN  US 
DIRECTLY.  BECAUSE  OF  THE  LINKAGE  BETWEEN 
MODERNISATION  AND  ARMS  CONT~OL IT  IS 
t 
ESSENTIAL  THAT  THE  ALLIANCE  /  ARMS  CONTROL 
POSITION  REMAINS  CREDIBLE.  IN  THIS  SENSE 1 
WHILE  THE  ZERO  OPTION  CONSUTUTED  A USEFUL 
TACTIC  IN  THE  PUBLIC  RELATIONS  BATTLE 1 
FEW  BELIEVE  THAT  IT  REPRESENTS  A REALISTIC 
OUTCOME.  WE  MUST  REMEMBER  THAT  THERE  IS 
NOW  A THIRD  FORCE  AT  THE  NEGOTIATING  TABLE 
- OUR  PUBLIC  OPINION.  THE  CREDIBILITY  OF 
OUR  POSITION  RESTS  ON  US  LOOKING  BEYOND 
THE  ZERO  OPTION  TO  CONSIDERING  WHAT  BALANCE 
OF  fORCES  WOULD  NOW  BE  ACCEPTABLE. 
EUROPEANS  MUST  NOT  BE  CONFINED  TO  THE  ROLE 
OF  SPECTATORS~  EVEN  CLOSELY  INFO~t1gQ~·:_ ____ _ 
21. 
' 
SPECTATORS~  WE  MUST  PRESS  FOR  FLEXIBILITY 
IN  THESP  NEGOTIATIONS  BECAUSE  WITHOUT 
PROGRESS  DEPLOYMENTS  WILL  BE  VERY 
DIFFICULT~  IF  NOT  IMPOSSIBLE. 
THESE  ARE  BUT  TWO  ISSUES  ON  WHICH 
EUROPEANS  MAKE  THEIR  VOICES  HEARD. 
HoWEVER~  EUROPEAN  INFLUENCE  WILL  ONLY  BE 
EFFECTIVE  IF  IT  IS  UNITED. 
A MORE  COHERENT  EUROPEAN  APPROACH 
COULD  HAVE  TWO  IMPORTANT  CONSEQUENCES  IN 
TERMS  OF  DEALING  WITH  THE  QUESTION  OF 
PUBLIC  OPINION.  fiRSTLY 1  IT  COULD  CONVINCE 
THE  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  THAT  THE  EUROPEANS  ARE 
SERIOUS  ABOUT  THEIR  OWN  DEFENSE  AND 
SECONDLY  IT  COULD  GENERATE  PUBLIC  SUPPORT 
IN  EUROPE  BY  DEMONSTRATING  THAT  EuROPEAN 
SECURITY  POLICY  IS  DERIVED  FROM  EUROPEAN  . 
ASSESSMENTS  AND  ANALYSIS.  IN  THIS  RESPECT 1 
IT  IS  INTERESTING  TO  NOTE  THE  VIRTUAL 
ABSENCE  OF  A SERIOUS  ANTI-NUCLEAR  MOVEMENT 
IN  FRANCE~  WHERE  FRENCH  NUCLEAR  WEAPONS 
ARE  QUITE  CLEARLY  FOR  FRANCE  AND  FRANCE I 
''  22 I 
ALONE, 
fiNALLY1  IF  ONE  NEEDS  TO  SEEK 
FURTHER  JUSTIFICATION  FOR  THE  EMERGENCE 
OF  A MORE  ASSERTIVE  AND  INDEPENDENT 
EUROPE1  THEN  ONE  NEED  LOOK  NO  FURTHER 
THAN  THE  QUESTION  OF  EUROPEAN  DIGNITY 
AND  SELF-RESPECT.  IT  IS  NOW  TIME  FOR 
EUROPE  TO  ADOPT  A RESPONSIBILITY 
COMMENSURATE  WITH  HER  ECONOMIC  STATUS1 
TIME  THAT  SHE  SHOULD  PLAY  A MORE 
< 
' 
INFLUENTIAL  ROLE  IN  WORLD  ~FFAIRS 1 
OFFERING  TO  MANY  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
SUCH  AS  THOSE  OF  LATIN  AMERICA  IF  NOT 
A THIRD  WAY1  AT  LEAST  AN  ALTERNATIVE 
TO  THE  TWO  SUPER  POWERS. 
'• 
WHATEVER  THE.  DESIRABILITY  OF 
GREATER  EUROPEAN  COHESION  IN  SECURITY 
POLICY1  IT  WOULD  ~E WRONG  OF  ME  TO 
IGNORE  THE  VERY  REAL  PROBLEMS  THAT  LIE 
' 
IN  ITS  PATH.  THE  MOST  OBVIOUS  OF  THESE 
CONCERNS  THE  GROUPING  OF  EUROPEAN  NATIONS 
/SUCH  A DEVELOPMENT 
23. 
SUCH  A DEVELOPMENT  WOULD  INVOLVE.  As 
THE  TITLE  OF  MY  TALK  INDICATES1  I 
BELIEVE  THAT  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  SECURITY 
MUST  EVENTUALLY  BE  ASSUMED  BY  THE  10  OF 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY.  IN  THIS  RESPECT 
WE  MUST  BUILD  ON  THE  PROGRESS  ACHIEVED 
IN  EUROP~AN POLITICAL  CO-OPERATION.  THE 
MEMBERS  OF  THE  CoMMUNI TV  HAVE  r.1ADE 
CONSIDERABLE  PROGRESS  IN  HARMONIZING 
VARIOUS  ASPECTS  OF  THE  FOREIGN  POLICIES 
OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL  MEMBERS.  THIS  CO-OPERATION 
PROVIDES  THE  BASIS  FOR  THE  ENLARGEMENT  OF 
COHMUNITY  INTEREST  INTO  THE  FIELD  OF 
SECURITY1  INDEED  RECOGNITION  OF  THIS 
NECESSITY  HAS  ALREADY  BEEN  SIGNALLED  BY 
THE  FOREIGN  MINISTERS  WHEN  THEY  MET  IN 
LONDON  LAST  OCTOBER1  AND  THE  GENSCHER/ 
COLUMBO  INITIATIVE  CONTAINS  A SIMILAR 
RECOMMENDATION.  As  A MEASURE  OF  HOW  FAR 
/WE  HAVE  COME 24. 
WE  HAVE  COMEJ  IT  WOULD  HAVE  BEEN 
UNTHINKABLE  TEN  YEARS  AGO  THAT  A GERMAN 
FOREIGN  MINISTER  WOULD  HAVE  RECOMMENDED 
A MEETING  OF  THE  DEFENSE  MINISTERS  OF 
THE  TEN  WITHIN  THE  CONTEXT  OF  EUROPEAN 
POLITICAL  COOPERATION.  THERE  ARE  OF 
COURSE  STRONG  POLITICAL  DOUBTS  AND 
HESITATIONS  ON  THE  PARTS  OF  MANY  NATIONAL 
AUTHORITIES  AS  TO  JUST  WHERE  THIS  PROCESS 
COULD  LEAD.  BuT  THERE  IS  ALSO  INCREASING 
SUPPORT  AS  THE  DILEMMA  OF  OUR  EXISTING 
STRUCTURE  BECOMES  MORE  AND  MORE  APPARENT. 
I  REALIZE  THAT  FOR  MANY  OF  THE 
PROFESSIONAL  EUROPEAN  WATCHERS  IN  THIS 
AUDIENCEJ  THESE  IDEAS  WILL  SEEM  FANCIFUL 
AND  REMOTE  FROM  POLITICAL  REALITY. 
HoWEVER1  NONE  OF  US  SHOULD  UNDERESTIMATE 
THE  PUBLIC  PRESSURES  THAT  ARE  BUILDING 
AND  TO  WHICH  WE  AS  POLITICIANS  MUST 
RESPOND,  IN  EUROPE1  MOMENTUM  IN  THE 
DIRECTION  OF  WHICH  I  AM  TALKING  IS  ALREADY 
DISCERNIBLE1  IT  HAS  BEGUN  WITH  THE  PEACE 
/MOVEMENT  AND  THEIR 
25. 
MOVEMENT'AND  THEIR  EXAMINATION  OF 
AL TERNA T,.I VES  TO  OUR  EXISTING  SECURITY 
ARRANGEMENTS.  INDEED  IT  IS  IRONIC 
THAT  THE.  PEACE  MOVEMENT  REPRESENTS  THE 
FIRST  ATTEMPT  TOWARDS  DEVELOPING  A 
COHERENT  EUROPEAN  APPROACH  TO  SECURITY. 
IF  MOVEMENT  IS  DISCERNIBLE  ON  THE  LEFT 
OF  THE  POLITICAL  SPECTRUM  AS  A REACTION 
TO  THE  EXCESSES  OF  THE  REAGAN  ADMINISTRATION1 
IT  CAN  ALSO  BE  SEEN  ON  THE  RIGHT  WHERE  MANY 
BELIEVE  THAT  EUROPE  SHOULD  PREPARE  FOR 
THE  DAY  WHEN1  FRUSTRATED  WITH  EUROPEAN 
PASSIVISMJ  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITHDRAWS 
ITS  TROOPS. 
WITHIN  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
ITSELF  THERE  ARE  SIGNS  OF  A DESIRE  TO 
MOVE  FORWARD  IN  THIS  DIRECTION.  THIS 
AUTUMN  FOR  THE  FIRST  TIMEJ  THE  EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT  WILL  RECEIVE  A REPORT  ON 
EUROPEAN  SECURITY  FROM  A DANISH  RAPPORT·EUR1 
NIELS  HAAGERUP.  I  HOPE  THAT  IN  THISJ  AND 
IN  OTHER  WAYS~ WE  CAN  ENCOURAGE  DISCUSSION 
/AND  DEBATE  OF 26. 
AND  DEBATE  OF  A EUROPEAN  SECURITY  CONCEPT. 
lN  CONCLUSION  LET  ME  REITERATE 
MY  BELIEF  THAT  THE  CHALLENGES  THAT  FACE 
US  TODAY~  PARTICULARLY  THE  NEED  TO 
RESPOND  TO  PUBLIC  OPINION~ ,DEMAND  A NEW 
RESPONSE  AND  NEW  INI-TIATIVES.  THE  ERA 
OF  BILATERAL  RELATIONS  WHICH  HAS  SERVED 
US  FOR  THE  PAST  THIRTY  YEAR~ IS  NO  LONGER  .. 
SUFFICIENT  TO  COPE  WITH  THE  MULTITUDE  OF 
TRANSATLANTIC  PROBLEMS  AND  CONCERNS. 
WHATEVER  THE  DOUBTS~ WHATEVER  THE 
INSTITUTIONAL  DIFFICULTIES~  WE  IN  EUROPE 
MUST  ACCEPT  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  WE  HAVE 
FOR  SO  LONG  IGNORED  - THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
A COMMON  APPROACH  TO  OUR  OWN  SECURITY. 
IN  MY  VIEW  IT  1£ POSSIBLE  TO  ESTABLISH 
A CONSENSUS  FOR  WESTERN  SECURITY  BUT  ONLY 
IF  THIS  POLICY  REFLECTS  THE  POLITICAL~ 
SOCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  NEEDS  OF  THE  SOCIETY 
IT  IS  PROTECTING~  AND  IF  ITS  MEANS  ARE 
/SEEN  TO  BE  ·"' 
27. 
. . 
SEEN  TO  BE  PROPORTIONATE  TO  ITS  ENDS, 
THIS  POLICY  CAN  ONLY  BE  DEVELOPED  FROM 
WITHIN~  IT  CANNOT  BE  IMPOSED  FROM  THE 
OUTSIDE •. 
GREATER  EUROPEAN  CO-ORDINATION 
AND  COHERENCE  OVER  SECURITY  POLICY  IS  . 
CONSISTENT  WITH  THE  ATLANTIC  RELATIONSHIP1 
INDEED  IT  COULD  GREATLY  STRENGTHEN  IT.  ON 
THE  OTHER  HAND  THE  TRENDS  TOWARD  SEPARATION 
ARE  VERY  EVIDENT~  BOTH  IN  THE  NUCLEAR 
DISCONTENT  IN  EUROPE  AND  THE  CRIES  FOR 
TROOP  WITHDRAWALS  HERE.  IF  WE  ARE  TO 
AVERT  THIS  PROCESS  THEN  WE  MUST  ACT  NOW. 